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Few issues have dominated American foreign policy over the past 30 years than the 
contentious relationship that America holds with Iran. Of particular concern has 
been how the US should respond to the existence of an illicit nuclear program within 
Iran. As of January 16th of 2016 however, US-Iran relations entered a new era with 
the full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action which outlines 
actions that Iran must take and maintain in order to rejoin the international 
community as a country with a legitimate interest in nuclear power. However, as we 
have learned from past nuclear deals, the JCPOA doesn’t guarantee that Iran will 
continue to follow international agreements in regards to its nuclear program. 
Because of the past experience that US has had with countries who have made 
commitments about their nuclear programs, it is necessary that we continue to 
analyze all facets of out relationship to Iran, and the threat of their nuclear program.  
If we trust solely in international diplomacy, we lose the ability to retaliate in 
the event that Iran doesn’t uphold their end of the bargain. Without the guarantee of 
enforcement of the deal, Iran will have no incentive to continue to follow the deal. 
Because of this, continued analysis is necessary into the ability of the US and other 
countries to forcefully ensure that Iran doesn’t expand its current peaceful nuclear 
energy program into a dangerous nuclear arms program. 
This analysis must include the possibility of a preemptive strike occurring in 
an attempt to delay Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. This paper will attempt to 
conduct such an analysis. The goal of this work is to determine if the US or Israel 
currently have the ability to put a halt to Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon if 
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necessary. While this option is not needed at the moment, and is not, and should not 
be a topic of heated debate it remains an important peripheral issue. The wisdom of 
actually attacking Iran is a simple issue right now: it isn’t necessary. In fact, debating 
the wisdom of such an attack will largely be left out of this analysis. Except where 
that discussion directly is impacted by the ability of the US or Israel to successfully 
stop the development of a nuclear bomb by Iran, I will leave the topic without 
discussion. 
What I will discuss is what an attack would look like, if the necessity arises. 
Before that analysis can take place, in Part I, a brief discussion of the development of 
the Iranian- US relations is necessary, along with a brief discussion of the history of 
Iran’s nuclear program in order to understand what facilities are important to the 
program. In Part II, I will briefly analyze the US and Israeli forces in the region, and 
their capabilities based on previous conflicts. In Part III, I will perform an analysis of 
the capabilities to inflict long-term damage on the Iranian nuclear weapons program 
based on current capabilities.  
 
Part I: Historical Perspective 
 For most current scholars, Iran has always been an enemy. This however, has 
not always been the case when we look to the period before the post-Cold War 
world. In fact, Iran was one of America’s major projects for the early part of the Cold 
War. Based on both geographic and political factors, the US spent a considerable 
amount of time attempting to reform Iran into a modern, industrialized nation. Iran 
and the US shared many of the same interests in the region and the alliance between 
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the US and Iran was a pragmatic one1. This was accomplished through ensuring a 
pro-US leader in the coup of 1953 to install a Prime Minister in Iran that would 
allow that Shah of Iran, Mohammad-Rezā Shāh Pahlavi to rule more directly. This 
coup was unpopular in Iran and led to the widespread anti-American sentiment that 
we see today. The US was generous in its arming of the now powerful Shah and 
many of these armaments still remain in Iranian control.  
 Friendly relations also existed between Israel and Iran during this period. 
Following the creation of Israel, Iran was one of the first countries to create 
economic and political ties with Israel2. These relations were abruptly disrupted 
with the Iranian revolution of 1979, and the rise of an anti-Israel regime that 
continues to rule today3.  
The revolution in Iran was in part due to the perception that the Shah had 
surrendered much of the control of both Iranian military and economic affairs to the 
Americans, losing the support of the Iranian populace in the process4. The Iranian 
revolution suddenly changed the dynamic of US policy goals in the Middle East. 
What had been a friendly government ruled by an ally became overnight a sworn 
bitter enemy, whose establishment was at least partially focused on decreasing US 
influence in the area.  
                                                        
1 Vakil, Sanam(2014) Obama’s Iranian Gamble, The International Spectator: Italian 
Journal of International Affairs, 49:3, 8-13, DOI: 10.1080/03932729.2014.952980. At 9. 
2 Slager, Katherine. "Legality, Legitimacy and Anticipatory Self-Defense: Considering an 
Israeli Preemptive Strike on Iran's Nuclear Program." N.C. J.INT'LL.&COM. REG. 38 
(2012): 267-325. Print. At 308. 
3 Ibid. At 308. 
4 Vakil, Sanam(2014) Obama’s Iranian Gamble, The International Spectator: Italian 
Journal of International Affairs, 49:3, 8-13, DOI: 10.1080/03932729.2014.952980. At 9. 
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 The resulting Iranian state was predisposed to see itself as a counter to the 
US by a number of factors. Key among these was the opposition of Ayatollah 
Khomeini. Khomeini saw the US as a threat to Iran and wanted to extract, as much as 
possible Iranian interests from interacting with American interests. It was 
Khomeini’s view that US and Iranian interests were diametrically opposed5. This 
state view of the US was combined with a revival of a nationalist sentiment among 
the populace that hearkened back to the greatness of the Persian Empire. This 
opposition from the very founding of the Islamic Republic helped to create the 
animosity that we see today between the two countries. 
 Even if the Iranian Revolution hadn’t severally damaged US-Iranian relations, 
the Iran-Iraq war would. Throughout the war, largely due to the results of the 
Iranian Hostage Crisis and the Iranian Revolution, the US supported the Iraqis in the 
war6. While the US did not intervene directly, it did supply Saddam Hussein’s Iraqis 
with the technology to fight the Iranians to a stalemate. During the war, Saddam 
used chemical weapons against the Iranian people to devastating effect. To this day, 
US support for Iraq is linked to those chemical attacks7. 
 It is in this context of a contentious relationship that recent efforts to 
negotiate an end to the contested nature of Iran’s nuclear program have taken place. 
While the original relationship showed a great deal of promise for promoting 
                                                        
5 Barzegar, Kayhan Iran–US Relations in the Light of the Nuclear Negotiations (2014), 
The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 49:3, 1-7, DOI: 
10.1080/03932729.2014.953311. At 2. 
6 Vakil, Sanam(2014) Obama’s Iranian Gamble, The International Spectator: Italian 
Journal of International Affairs, 49:3, 8-13, DOI: 10.1080/03932729.2014.952980. At 10. 
7 Ibid. At 10. 
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stability in the region, the events of the Islamic Revolution removed any chance of a 
close partnership.  
 The central issue of contest between Iran and the US since those events has 
been the existence of a nuclear program within Iran. While secrecy shrouded the 
program through the 1990s, the revelation that Iran was developing its nuclear 
capabilities made the nuclear issue the centerpiece of the US-Iranian conflict. 
 Shortly following the Iranian revolution and the end of the Iran-Iraq war, 
Iranian authorities decided to restart the nuclear program that had been initially 
started under the shah. Two primary reasons are noted for this strategic move, both 
of which were due to the Iranian experience during the Iraq-Iran war: first, US 
involvement and support for Iraq during the war led to a desire to counter US 
hegemony in the region, and second, the energy shortage during the war also 
showed a need for the development of alternative energy sources to supplement 
Iran’s vast oil reserves8. Iran’s view of US policies in the region have been 
increasingly hostile 
In 2011, an IAEA report noted that Iran might have been carrying out actions 
that would lead to a nuclear weapon9. Iran has extensively researched the 
development of nuclear weapons, though they have never addressed these 
                                                        
8 Hussain, Nazir and Abdullah Sannia. “Iran Nuclear Deal: Implications for Regional 
Security” Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 22, Issue - 2, 2015, 475:493. At 478. 
9 Ibid. At 309. 
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accusations.10 Rather, Iran continues to claim that they are not pursuing weapons, 
but only the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy11. 
 Throughout this troubled history, several attempts have been made to 
negotiate with Iran in order to find an internationally acceptable solution to the 
question of Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. One of the first attempts was by the 
EU-3 in 2003 when Germany, France, and the UK unsuccessfully attempted to 
initiate a diplomatic process12. These negotiations, which were to cover a broad 
range of topics, including security and counterterrorism were predicated on Iran 
halting progress towards enrichment during the negotiations. When it was 
discovered that Iran was continuing the process towards enrichment, the 
negotiations were halted. This process, along with several others, all failed to 
produce significant results. 
 In 2010, UNSC Resolution 1929 began the implementation process of a host 
of sanctions against Iran for its continued nuclear program13. The negotiation 
process ultimately led to an interim agreement in 2013 known as the Joint Plan of 
Action14. The Joint Plan of Action then led to Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA). The JCPOA includes five key areas of agreement. 
                                                        
10 Cordesman, Anthony H. "Analyzing the Impact of Preventive Strikes Against Iran’s 
Nuclear Facilities." Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10 Sept. 2012. Web. 
19 Nov. 2015. At 14. 
11 Hussain, Nazir and Abdullah Sannia. “Iran Nuclear Deal: Implications for Regional 
Security” Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 22, Issue - 2, 2015, 475:493. At 479. 
12 Hussain, Nazir and Abdullah Sannia. “Iran Nuclear Deal: Implications for Regional 
Security” Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 22, Issue - 2, 2015, 475:493. At 479. 
13 Ibid. At 479. 
14 Ibid. At 479. 
 9 
 First, the JCPOA contained strict limits on enrichment. Under the JCPOA, Iran 
agreed to severely limit the amount of uranium that it enriches, as well as limiting 
the extent to which it enriches uranium. It also requires that the Fordow enrichment 
facility be used exclusively for peaceful purposes15. While Iran was enriching 
uranium to 20% LEU at Natanze and Fordow16, under the JCPOA enrichment will be 
limited to 3.67%17. The enrichment requirements extend the breakout period for 
the production of a nuclear weapon from the current 2-3 months estimate to a full 
year under the JCPOA18. The importance of the level of enrichment is what each level 
of enrichment is used for. LEU is used for peaceful purposes such as creating energy, 
only has to be enriched to just below 5%. Research reactors often contain uranium 
that is enriched up to 20%. Finally, nuclear weapons contain uranium that is 
enriched to 90%. Thus, enrichment is the key to creating nuclear weapons, and the 
JCPOA, if followed will prevent the Iranians from possession of the materials to build 
a weapon. 
 Second, the JCPOA provides for extensive accountability measures by 
requiring that Iran allow regular inspection by IAEA inspectors. These inspections 
will allow the international community to ensure that the other provisions of the 
JCPOA are being followed. These inspections also will be the likely way that the 
international community will find out if violations are occurring. Because the JCPOA 
                                                        
15 Ibid. At 481. 
16 Cordesman, Anthony H. "Analyzing the Impact of Preventive Strikes Against Iran’s 
Nuclear Facilities." Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10 Sept. 2012. Web. 
19 Nov. 2015. At 14. 
17 Hussain, Nazir and Abdullah Sannia. “Iran Nuclear Deal: Implications for Regional 
Security” Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 22, Issue - 2, 2015, 475:493. At 480. 
18 Hussain, Nazir and Abdullah Sannia. “Iran Nuclear Deal: Implications for Regional 
Security” Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 22, Issue - 2, 2015, 475:493. At 480. 
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requires extensive access for the IAEA, any restrictions that Iran places on these 
inspections will be met with extreme suspicion. 
 Third, further development of a heavy water reactor at Arak will be halted, 
with the site being redesigned in a way that ensures that plutonium won’t be 
produced through the operation of the nuclear reactor. The JCPOA requires that the 
core of the heavy water reactor be destroyed and Iran is prevented from building 
any further heavy water reactors for the next 15 years. Plutonium is a second path 
that Iran could use to create a nuclear weapon. While some nuclear weapons are 
made with Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), another weapon design uses plutonium, 
which is one of the byproducts of the production of electricity from a heavy-water 
reactor. The JCPOA would through this requirement cut off the second path to a 
nuclear weapon that Iran could take. 
 Fourth, all nuclear related sanctions were lifted from Iran. However, if Iran 
were to fail to abide by the JCPOA, the sanctions would be implemented again. 
 Lastly, timing restrictions. Iran is restricted in its enrichment activities for 
the next 10 years, and is banned from building any new enrichment or heavy-water 
reactor for the next 15 years. 
 The JCPOA marks one major step towards the resolution of the Iranian 
nuclear question. Ideally speaking, no military action will be necessary. The success 
of the JCPOA to this point gives reason for optimism for continued improvements in 
US-Iranian relations. While other issues were not on the table while negotiating the 
nuclear deal, the JCPOA does lay the groundwork for future negotiations on a host of 
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issues by reestablishing diplomatic ties19. It is important that the US continues to 
show that it is serious about enforcing the nuclear deal. The key to doing this is to 
ensure that Iran understands that the US is keeping a military option available. A US 
presence in the region is a key part in an attempt to signal to Iran that the JCPOA 
will be enforced20. The only foreseeable reason for Iran to violate the JCPOA were if 
it decided to create a nuclear weapon. The restrictions set out in the JCPOA are 
limited enough that the operation of a civilian nuclear program will not be 
significantly impacted by the treaty. Should the JCPOA be followed by Iran, it will 
have been one of the most successful examples of international diplomacy. However, 
if it fails, world powers will be left with a highly capable Iranian nuclear program 
and a government apparatus set on the creation of a nuclear weapon. 
All result and legacy of these negotiations and diplomacy now rest solely 
with Iran. The necessity of a preemptive strike is largely dependent on Iran finally 
deciding to create a nuclear weapon. Unless Iran does so, the decision on the part of 
the US or other nations to attack Iran would be met with condemnation from around 
the world. This is to say nothing of the opposition at home to attacking a sovereign 
nation without provocation. That Iran will at some point chose to create a nuclear 
weapon is far from given. After all, Iran has the technical ability to make nuclear 
                                                        
19 Barzegar, Kayhan Iran–US Relations in the Light of the Nuclear Negotiations (2014), 
The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 49:3, 1-7, DOI: 
10.1080/03932729.2014.953311. At 9. 
20 Davis, Lynn E., and David E. Thaler. "The Role of the USAF in the Days After a Deal 
with Iran." The Days After a Deal with Iran: Implications for the Air Force. RAND 
Corporation, 2015. Web. 1 Dec. 2015. At 2. 
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weapons, but has so far decided against their development21. It is interesting that 
Iran continues to act in a way that keeps its status among the international 
community in question. Rather than being open about their nuclear program, and 
being allowed to operate a nuclear industry to its fullest potential, Iran has 
continued to operate in secrecy, moving from one crisis point to another, dodging 
sanctions while struggling to maintain their nuclear program22. Perhaps under the 
JCPOA the Iranians will operate in an open way that avoids crises, however, based 
on the initial months under the JCPOA, including the continued testing of ballistic 
missiles and the capture of US military personnel, it appears that Iran will continue 
to act in an aggressive way towards the US in the region. This does not necessarily 
mean that they will violate the JCPOA, but it does set the stage for further 
confrontations. US sanctions and condemnation remain in place for some other 
Iranian actions. Events following the JCPOA indicate that US-Iranian relations will 
remain an area ripe for future conflict. 
Rather than taking the final step in creating a nuclear weapon, Iran has so far 
decided to remain a threshold state, similar to Japan23. This option allows Iran to 
acquire nuclear weapons very quickly should the need arise, all the while avoiding 
the international condemnation that would come with developing a weapon. Iran 
                                                        
21 Mehrish, B N. "Iran’s Nuclearization and Its Implications for Global and Regional 
Security." IUP Journal of International Relations 6.2 (2012): 67-79. Ebsco Host. Web. 30 
Nov. 2015. At 67. 
22 Miller, STEVEN E. "Proliferation gamesmanship: Iran and the politics of nuclear 
confrontation." Syracuse Law Review 57 (2007): 551. Print. At 564. 
23 Mehrish, B N. "Iran’s Nuclearization and Its Implications for Global and Regional 
Security." IUP Journal of International Relations 6.2 (2012): 67-79. Ebsco Host. Web. 30 
Nov. 2015. At 68. 
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has made it clear to the international community that it wants to maintain the 
ability to create a nuclear weapon, even if the international community protests. 
 Iran has decided so far not to take the final step. There are several reasons 
for this posture. In part, of course, the threat from foreign intervention deters the 
Iranians from developing a bomb, but there also remains strong opposition at home 
to the development of nuclear weapons. While hardliners support the development 
of nuclear weapons in order to defend against the ever-present threat from foreign 
powers24. Rather than being political outsiders, many of these hardliners are very 
powerful within the Iranian government hierarchy. Support for creating a nuclear 
deterrent includes Grand Ayatollah Khamenei, who believes that nuclear weapons 
would provide a valuable deterrent against foreign aggression25. For many Iranians, 
war is to be avoided at all costs. This view is heavily influenced by the experience of 
the Iran-Iraq war, in which Iran was devastated both economically and socially26. 
The Iranian government too is focused on avoiding war, instead working to build up 
other regimes throughout the region to challenge the presence and influence of the 
United States27. Iran’s key strategic goals since the Islamic Revolution have been to 
deter outside influence from the US while also extending its power throughout the 
region. This remains the greatest predictor of Iranian action. To this point, 
                                                        
24 Takeyh, Ray. "Iran, Israel and the Politics of Terrorism." Survival (2006): 83-96. Taylor 
and Francis Online. Web. 1 Dec. 2015. At 57. 
25 Mehrish, B N. "Iran’s Nuclearization and Its Implications for Global and Regional 
Security." IUP Journal of International Relations 6.2 (2012): 67-79. Ebsco Host. Web. 30 
Nov. 2015. At 70. 
26 Barzegar, Kayhan Iran–US Relations in the Light of the Nuclear Negotiations (2014), 
The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 49:3, 1-7, DOI: 
10.1080/03932729.2014.953311. At 3. 
27 Cordesman, Anthony H. "Analyzing the Impact of Preventive Strikes Against Iran’s 
Nuclear Facilities." Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10 Sept. 2012. Web. 
19 Nov. 2015. At 11. 
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developing a nuclear weapon has not served these goals in the estimation of the 
Iranian government decision makers. However, in the event that the ruling powers 
judge a nuclear weapon to be in Iran’s central interests, they will take the final step. 
 Iran also has significant reasons to want to create a nuclear weapon. Much as 
Israel views Iran as an existential threat, Iran views Israel’s nuclear arsenal as a dire 
threat to its national security, in addition to viewing nearly all US actions in the 
region as being directly threatening to its interests28. Israel, unlike all of Iran’s other 
local enemies has a highly advanced conventional and nuclear arsenal that would 
outmatch Iran’s military defenses in the event of a war. Given the position of Iran in 
relation to Israel militarily, it would make sense that Iran would seek a nuclear 
weapon. One of the few tools that an otherwise inferior military has to prevent an 
attack from a nation that they see as an aggressor with a more capable military is 
the deterrent of a nuclear weapon. If Iran were to acquire a nuclear weapon, Israel 
would be unable to maintain a credible threat of attack because of the consequences 
of an Iranian nuclear counterattack. Currently, the Israeli military holds broad 
advantages over the Iranian military due to technological advancement. However, 
Iran with a nuclear weapon would make many of these advantages irrelevant, as 
Iran would always have a credible option to deliver immense levels of destruction to 
Israel. The pursuit of both of Iran’s most important foreign policy goals, deterring an 
attack from Israel or the US and becoming the regional hegemonic power, would be 
                                                        
28 Bahgat, Gawdat. “Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East: Iran and Israel.” 2005, 
Contemporary Security Policy, 26:1, 25-43, DOI: 10.1080/13523260500116067. At 30. 
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greatly enhanced by the acquisition of a nuclear weapon29. Achieving the 
technological feat of creating a nuclear weapon makes sense from an Iranian 
perspective, but perhaps more importantly, Iran’s actions look like those of a nation 
interested in creating a nuclear weapon. 
 Iran’s nuclear infrastructure was designed with the ultimate goal of creating 
a nuclear weapon. While many obstructions exist to Iran ultimately creating a 
weapon, and while serious reasons exist for the Iranians to avoid crossing that 
threshold, they have nevertheless created a robust, heavily guarded, incredibly 
secretive nuclear infrastructure. Iran has largely cited the need for an alternative 
energy source to compensate for their overreliance on oil. This claim does have 
some merit. Iran’s economy is heavily reliant on the oil industry. Despite its 
immense oil resources, Iran still has difficulty keeping the lights on from time to 
time. Population growth and industrialization have increased the energy needs of 
Iran to the extent that new sources of energy, excluding oil will have to be used 
extensively by 2020 in order to meet domestic demand while also continuing 
petroleum exports30. Electricity shortages have plagued much of Iran over the past 
decade, and nuclear energy would provide a consistent, abundant, and nearly 
limitless supply of electricity. However, given the desperate economic situation that 
developing a clandestine nuclear program has put Iran in due to international 
condemnation, continuing to develop nuclear power has done little to help Iran 
                                                        
29 Kroenig, Matthew. A Time to Attack The Looming Iranian Nuclear Threat. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Print. At 32. 
30 Raas, Whitney, and Austin Long. "Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to 
Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities." International Security 31, no. 4 (Spring 2007): 7-33. 
At 11. 
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address its energy shortage. Additionally, the international community has not 
asked that Iran give up nuclear power, rather it has simply expected Iran to act in 
good faith by avoiding creating easy avenues for a weapon such as HEU or 
producing plutonium form a Heavy Water reactor. 
 Much of this analysis assumes that Iran is a rational actor, and that it would 
avoid any decision that would threaten its continued existence. Thought the signing 
of the JCPOA does indicate that they are willing to negotiate, the Iranians still have 
exhibited signs that they might act in ways that do not take into account the results 
of those policies. The rhetoric of the Iranian regime against Israel combined with the 
overwhelmingly negative view of Israel by the Iranian public could also cause the 
public to call for the destruction of Israel31. 
A further complicating factor is Iran’s close ties with terrorists throughout 
the world. Iran is the greatest state supporter of terrorism, funding organizations 
throughout the world. The United States and other international intelligence 
agencies have long accused Iran of plotting and carrying out terrorist attacks 
worldwide, and also supporting various terrorist organizations. While Iran denies 
the accusation, the US has asserted that Iran even went so far as to plot to 
assassinate a Saudi Ambassador in Washington DC32. The groups that Iran supports 
                                                        
31 Mindell, David, A Nuclear Iran: Nuclear Warfare or Regional Hegemony (Fall 2008). 
Yale Israel Journal, Fall 2008. Available at SSRN: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1691913 At 72. 
32 Mehrish, B N. "Iran’s Nuclearization and Its Implications for Global and Regional 
Security." IUP Journal of International Relations 6.2 (2012): 67-79. Ebsco Host. Web. 30 
Nov. 2015. At 76. 
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are used to fight against Israel, the US and other powers throughout the region33. 
The support for terrorism in Iran is not a new phenomenon, but dates back to 
terrorist attacks in1983 in Beirut and in Saudi Arabia in 199634. The long history of 
Iranian support for terrorism can be viewed in two ways. First, it could simply be an 
extension of the dual goals of decreasing American influence while helping Iran to 
consolidate control of the Middle East. Or, second, it could be viewed as a deeper 
ideological view of the world, one that could have apocalyptic consequences if given 
the chance. This second option is important to consider because it is a logical 
extension of the way that Iran came into existence. Given the radicalism that was 
built into the Iranian government through the 1979 revolution, many of the most 
radical voices are also some of the most powerful ones.  
Part II: US, Israeli and Iranian Military Capabilities 
 
 The US has repeatedly shown its ability to project power in the Middle East. 
Despite recent setbacks in Iraq and difficulties in Afghanistan, US forces in the 
region remain an overwhelming force against any conventional opponent. History 
has shown the ability of the American military to quickly and completely defeats 
conventional threats. Because of the extensive strategic interests that the US has in 
the region, there remain significant US resources in the region. 
                                                        
33 Mindell, David, A Nuclear Iran: Nuclear Warfare or Regional Hegemony (Fall 2008). 
Yale Israel Journal, Fall 2008. Available at SSRN: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1691913 At 73. 
34 Dobbins, James. "Coping with a Nuclearising Iran." Survival (2011): 37-50. Print. At 
38. 
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 The US maintains approximately 35,000 military personnel in the Gulf, 
ensuring and extensive continued presence in the region35.  The key asset in the 
region is the CTF-50 Strike Force, based in Bahrain36. This is one of the 10 Carrier 
groups that the United States operates. Each includes and aircraft carrier with its air 
group and multiple supporting ships. These Carrier groups represent the largest 
concentration of power available to the United States. Besides the fighter and strike 
capabilities of F-18 Super Hornets, Early Warning systems provided by E-C2 
Hawkeye aircraft, and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) provided by EA-18 
Growlers, the carrier group also boasts hundreds of Tomahawk cruise missiles. An 
explanation of the combined firepower of a single Carrier group is too exhaustive for 
a work of this size, but the basic summary is that a Carrier group represents the 
ability to carry out a full air campaign independent of other resources in the area. 
The US air force boasts the worlds most advanced air power capabilities. Its fighters, 
strike aircraft, and communications and electronic warfare technologies are vastly 
superior to the hodgepodge assortment of assets that Iran fields.  
 The US also uses an array of aircraft both to boost access to information, and 
deny access to information on the ground for its enemies. For suppression of air 
defenses, the US uses two types of aircraft to jam communications while providing 
strike aircraft with information on potential targets. The EC-130 Compass Call is 
tasked with electronic warfare focused on blocking voice communications, while the 
                                                        
35 Cordesman, Anthony H. Center for Strategic Studies. July 15th, 2015.“Joint and 
Asymmetric Warfare, Missiles and Missile Defense, Civil War and Non-State Actors, and 
Outside Powers” Web. At 505. 
36 Ibid. At 520. 
 19 
RC-130 provides updates to strike aircraft that can then destroy identified SAM 
sites37. 
 That being said, extensive other resources also exist in the region, including a 
second Carrier group stationed in the Indian Ocean. While open-source information 
on the basing of Air Force and Marine Corps assets in the region is severely limited, 
based on the quick ability to carry out extensive airstrikes against ISIS without 
substantial rebasing, it is fair to assume that these assets are similarly impressive. 
The devastating firepower of the US military has been put to use against 
similar regimes to Iran on several occasions. The most recent example of this was 
the short Libyan air war. This operation showed that American air power could 
quickly and decisively tilt the outcome of a military campaign. It also demonstrates 
some restrictions to and abilities of American air power. While air power did not 
win the Libyan civil war, it did play a pivotal role in allowing for the defeat of 
Gaddafi’s armies. 
The Libyan air war was impressive for its low cost of only a few billion 
dollars, and for the fact that there were no American injuries in the conflict. It is also 
impressive in the fact that it was essentially completed by already available forces, 
without major deployment of new forces to the area. 
While the targets attacked in Libya offer little comparison with those that 
would be targeted in Iran – most of the Libyan targets were “soft” targets, while 
most of the Iranian targets are heavily guarded, and hardened, there are still some 
important lessons to be learned through the Libyan air war. Particularly interesting 
                                                        
37 Talmadge, Cailtin. "Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of 
Hormuz." International Security 33, no. 1 (Summer 2008): 82-117. At 114. 
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for our purposes, the effect of 21st century air power on outdated and dilapidated 
technology.  While the Libyan air defense did have access to Soviet S-200 (SA-200) 
systems, the same systems that make up key parts of Iran’s Air Defense system, 
these S-200s were largely unusable. While military commanders reported that they 
were 60% ready, actual readiness was just 10%38.  
The US military capabilities both throughout the world and in the Middle 
East are unparalleled. The US has the ability to target up to 10,000 targets at the 
same time39, much higher than the necessary number requisite during an attack on 
Iran. An attack on Iran would involve a very limited set of targets, those crucial to 
the management of the nuclear program.  
 The Israeli military is, on a smaller scale, equivalently well prepared for an 
air war. The technology possessed by the Israelis, especially the air force, is on part 
with American air power. This is primarily a result of the close ties between the two 
countries.  
In June 2008, the Israeli military attempted a daunting task. A simulated air 
operation with more than 100 aircraft, a large portion of Israel’s air force, meant to 
give pilots a chance to simulate an attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure40. A 
difficult task for any military, for Israel, this would be an all or nothing operation. 
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The chances of true success would be severely limited, both by the number of 
aircraft required for the operation, as well as the technological difficulties of such an 
attack. 
 Completing such a military operation would only be used after all other 
options have been exhausted on the part of the Israel to attempt to keep Iran from 
completing a nuclear weapon. This option would also assume that the US had given 
up on stopping Iran from finishing the bomb. It is unlikely, barring a complete 
breakdown of the diplomatic process that Israel would ever consider carrying out 
this option. The condemnation from around the world would be greater, and the 
retribution from Iran’s proxies potentially devastating. 
 Nevertheless, it is important to consider this option for one important 
reason: Israel continues to consider it. Even though Israeli commanders admit the 
difficulty of the operation, and further concede that it will only delay, not destroy 
the Iranian program, this operation remains as a possible desperation attempt by 
Israel to keep Iran from developing a bomb. 
 Israel does have a few distinct advantages over the United States in the 
planning and execution of such an attack. First, the experience gleaned from 
previous operations. This would not be the first time that Israel decided to take the 
fate of a foreign countries’ nuclear program into its own hands. In 1981, Israel 
successfully destroyed Iraq’s nuclear reactor at Osirak and again in 2007 a 
suspected North Korean supplied reactor was destroyed at Syria. These military 
operations, while no doubt on a much smaller scale, against lesser equipped and 
prepared opponents do give Israel a key advantage in that they have faced this type 
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of operation already, and so far have been very successful in carrying out these 
operations. A second advantage that Israel holds over the United States is the 
willpower to make this operation politically feasible. For Israel this is considered, 
rightfully or no, a survival issue. The success of the Iranian nuclear program would 
mark the demise of the Israeli state. The stakes are high enough for Israel that this 
type of operation would not be a terribly divisive issue within Israel that is 
assuming of course, that Iran has decided to build an actual nuclear weapon. 
 The Israeli military operates within a very specific mission set, and this helps 
it to focus on doing the necessary work at hand. While other nations, specifically the 
United States, have large territories and many treaty commitments to uphold, the 
Israeli military has a very singular central goal: assuring the continued existence of 
the state of Israel. While the Israeli military is limited by the size of the country’s 
population and size, it is also one of the most advanced in the world. Both the 
necessary concern for continued existence, and close ties with the United States 
have allowed the Israeli military to develop or obtain, and operate some of the most 
sophisticated and advanced military equipment in the world. Additionally, 
maintaining the capability of denying Iran a nuclear weapon has been a policy goal 
for the Israeli military, and such, investments have been made in the military in 
order to achieve this goal. One example of the way Israel has built its air forces to 
the mission of attacking Iran is through long-range capabilities. While many nations 
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buy F-16s from the US, Israel’s model of the aircraft, the F-16I was specifically 
designed with additional fuel capacity in order to allow it to reach Iran41. 
Looking historically, the Israeli attack on the Osirak nuclear facility in Iraq 
provides us with some insight in to Israeli military tactics and their willingness to 
engage in a preemptive strike. 
First looking internally, the justification for the attack was that the nuclear 
reactor being built in Iraq was considered a threat to the existence of Israel42. This 
same analysis exists to a large extent today in Israeli circles. 
Second, the Osirak strike was immensely successful. The 16-plane strike 
force was able to completely destroy the Iraqi nuclear reactor without the loss of a 
single plane, or substantial collateral damage43. 
Third, an attack on the Iranian program would be much different than the 
attack on Osirak. Iran’s program is much further developed than Iraq’s was, with 
multiple important sites located throughout the country. Iran also has learned a lot 
from the Osirak attack, placing its nuclear infrastructure in heavily guarded 
locations44.  
Fourth, technological development has completely changed the dynamics of 
an air strike. While the original Osirak strike was completed with “dumb” bombs – 
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that is, bombs without any guidance features except gravity – nearly all munitions 
today are “smart”, with the most advanced GPS or laser guidance available. Israel 
has invested heavily in modernizing its munitions with these guidance 
technologies45. 
While an attack on Iran would be a completely different operation, the 
experience gained at Osirak does show that a preemptive attack can be successful. 
While the success of the military operation was impressive, more important was the 
success that the operation had in convincing Iraq to give up its pursuit of nuclear 
weapons.  
 More recently, Israel showed that it was still willing to take matters into its 
own hands. The Israeli attack on a reactor in Syria in 2007 remains a secretive 
operation, but some information can be gained from a short examination of the 
operation and its impacts. While a Syrian nuclear weapons program was probably 
years away, the reactor being built with the help of the North Koreans would have 
been a key part of any weapons program. The spent fuel from this reactor could 
have produced the necessary materials for one nuclear weapon per year46. The 
attack appears to have been a decisive moment for Syria, as current open-source 
intelligence has yet to identify further attempts to create new nuclear facilities. The 
Israeli attack on Syria was by all accounts a resounding success. Even the North 
Koreans have been reluctant to work with the Syrians any further on its nuclear 
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program, and the international scrutiny brought to Syria by the attack has stalled 
any further efforts on the part of the Syrians to develop nuclear weapons47. 
 In considering an attack on the Iranian nuclear program, Israel only has a few 
major military assets that would come into play. This analysis assumes that Israel 
will only be using its air forces. While surface-to-surface missiles and submarine 
forces may come into play, this will be discussed in more detail when we examine 
Iranian retaliation to an attack. 
 The first major system that the Israelis would use is a variant of the US made 
F-16, the F-16I, which was developed specifically for deep-strike missions by the 
Israelis48. This aircraft is capable of being refueled in-flight, further extending its 
mission range from an estimated 1,700 km with a weapons load of 2, 2,000 lb 
bombs. 
 The F-15I is another variant of an American made strike aircraft, specifically 
designed for ground strike missions. Like the F-16I, the F-15I has roughly a 1,700 
km range without refueling.49 
 Lastly, the Israelis also have the capability to refuel aircraft in flight through a 
variety of different aircraft. Though the exact numbers are not well known, the 
Israelis have both KC- 707s and KC-130Hs50.  
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 Unlike the militaries of the US and Israel, the Iranian military lacks the state-
of-the-art technology that its enemies boast. Most of its weapons systems are 
severely outdated. The systems that Iran does have are in poor condition due to 
being unable to receive spare parts from the US because of nuclear-related sanctions 
and export bans. The crews manning the systems used by the Iranian military aren’t 
properly trained for the equipment. Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, 
Iran lacks the communications and command to effectively operate a military in a 
modern environment. 
 Historically, Iran was well armed. Because of the close ties to the Americans, 
and the strategic importance of Iran to the region, the Iranian military under the 
Shah was well armed with the most advanced technology in the world. With the 
Islamic revolution, Iran lost access to its main military supplier. The US not only 
stopped delivery weapons systems on order, but also prevented the Iranians from 
access to spare parts for existing systems. This combined with the lack of continued 
training and expertise resulted in a military that has digressed with time.51 
Iran continues to attempt to modernize its military as well as keeping old 
systems in working order and updated as best as possible. While many of the 
systems that Iran does posses are out-of-date and would do little against the 
advanced capabilities of the US and Israelis, some introduction to the Iranian 
military forces is necessary. While Iran does have extensive ground forces, our focus 
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will be on aircraft and air defense forces, while the problem of naval forces will be 
discussed later in this work. 
On paper Iran’s air force is formidable, but years of sanctions has winnowed 
the force down to a small number of operational aircraft. The most formidable 
aircraft currently being used is the Mig-29. Iran operates approximately forty of 
these fourth generation fighter jets. Even these aircraft would not challenge the 
strike aircraft of the US or Israel52. Of these forty jets, only about two dozen are 
operational at any given time due to lack of maintenance53. In addition to the lack of 
properly maintained aircraft, the crews that operate these aircraft have not been 
trained effectively. 
Similarly, the most advanced Surface to Air (SAM) missile system used by the 
Iranians is the MIM-23b I-Hawk system, which was introduced in the 1970s. These 
systems suffer from the same lack of training as Iran’s air forces along with 
improper maintenance. Additionally, because Israel and the US have access to the 
exact same technology, the electronic countermeasures available against the I-Hawk 
system would be extensive, rendering its role in air defenses severely limited5455. 
Iran has tried repeatedly to procure Russian air defense systems. The delivery of 
advanced Russian air defense systems would make a significant difference for Iran’s 
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air defenses. The Russian made S-300 (NATO designation: SA-10 Grumble) is widely 
considered to be one of the most effective SAM systems in the world and would pose 
a threat to strike aircraft during a threat. However, as of yet, Russia has not 
delivered the ordered S-300 systems56. The Iranian do have as many as 25 of the 
older SA-6 air defense systems. However, there has been no evidence that these 
systems are operational: there hasn’t been a single attempt to demonstrate the use 
of these systems nor have they engaged any UAVs loitering near Iranian airspace57. 
One homegrown attempt to increase ground-to-ground capabilities is the 
Shahab-3 missile. This new, and so far unproven SSM (Surface-to-Surface Missile) 
would give Iran the reach to hit ground targets in Israel, and US bases throughout 
the region58. The Shahab-3 is particularly concerning to Israel because of its ability 
to deliver multiple warheads in a single missile, allowing for decoys to multiply the 
number of incoming targets that air defense systems would have to account for, and 
making it more difficult to neutralize the actual warhead59. Despite the advanced 
technology possessed by both the Israelis and American allies throughout the 
region, access to nuclear weapons would make the Shahab-3 missile a serious threat 
to security in the region should a conflict arise. 
Part III: Considering Military Force 
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While Iran wants to avoid direct military confrontation, it will continue to 
take advantage of any US failures in the Middle East60. Iran will do its best to ensure 
that the US will not take action against them, the assumption being that any US 
military action would be disastrous to the Iranian military and governing elite. 
 The JCPOA currently creates a framework that should keep Iran from 
developing nuclear weapons, at least for the next 15 years. However, it is important 
to understand that history of both Iran’s nuclear program, and the US experience 
with nuclear deals. Since 2003, Iran has agreed to cooperate with the IAEA, allowing 
the international community some level of oversight of Iran’s nuclear program. 
However, Iran has repeatedly reneged on its commitments to the international 
community on its nuclear program. The existence and development of Iran’s 
centrifuges, the involvement of Iran’s military in the development of Iran’s nuclear 
program and the acquisition of documents by Iran of plans for key components of 
nuclear weapons all represent serious discrepancies between what Iran has claimed 
that it is doing, and what can actually be confirmed by their nuclear program61. 
While the Iranian government has long claimed that it has no interest in the 
development of a nuclear weapon, it has pursued several key technologies and 
capabilities that indicate otherwise. Particularly, enrichment has been a major focus 
of the Iranian nuclear infrastructure. The only reason for Iran to create HEU is for 
the contruction of a nuclear weapon. Additionally, the creation of a heavy water 
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reactor would give Iran access to Plutonium, which is a second material that could 
be used to create a nuclear weapon. So while public statements indicate no interest 
in a nuclear weapon, the facilities being built show that this is at least a secondary 
goal of the Iranian nuclear program. The implication of the lack of consistency in 
Iran’s claims is that there is doubt as to the veracity of the things that they currently 
claim. The inherent risk of any nuclear deal is the unknown. We have restrictions on 
the facilities and practices that we know about, but the existence of secret 
components of the Iranian nuclear program remain a potential problem for the 
JCPOA 
  Why would it be problematic for Iran to build and possess nuclear weapons? 
The argument for keeping Iran nuclear weapon free goes deeper than just the 
interests of one, or even a group of countries. 
 While the Cold War showed the efficacy of deterrence, a similar project 
would be difficult in relation to Iran62. The US and her allies were able to convince 
the USSR that a nuclear war would be sufficiently devastating as to encourage the 
Soviet government to keep tight control of its nuclear assets and avoid a worldwide 
war. The international community lacks the power to ensure that Iran’s potential 
nuclear weapons will remain unused. The close ties that Iran maintains with a host 
of designated terrorist organizations and states that use chemical weapons against 
their civilian’s shows that hardline elements exist and have a powerful influence 
over Iranian politics. The risk of the hardliners gaining enough control of Iran’s 
nuclear weapons to initiate an attack appears to be high considering that some of 
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the most radical members of Iran’s government elite belong to the military, and 
specifically to the Revolutionary Guard, the elite paramilitary organization that 
operates separate from the armed forces of Iran63. A nuclear Iran is too risky for the 
world. A further threat exists not in the direct use of nuclear weapons by the 
Iranians, but through the transfer, accidental or intentional of these weapons to 
terrorist organizations. This transfer, which has been the central goal of 
nonproliferation efforts since the fall of the Soviet Union, would be unsurprising due 
to the close relations that the Revolutionary Guard maintains with some of the most 
radical terrorist groups in the world. While the Iranian government may maintain 
some semblance of rationality, a terrorist organization armed with a nuclear 
weapon remains the ultimate threat. Furthermore, Iran could deliver the materials 
necessary for a “dirty bomb” to one of its many proxy terrorist organizations, giving 
them the ability to avoid the most serious retaliation64. This threat only increases 
with a nuclear Iran. While the Soviet threat was very real, it was always rational, 
that guarantee is not secure when Iran comes into the picture. 
If Iran’s current government, and even the Revolutionary Guard are 
committed to keeping their stock of nuclear weapons secured and out of terrorist or 
radical hands, nuclear weapons in Iran would still be an unacceptable risk for the 
international community to take. While Iran has been one of the more stable powers 
in the region since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, history shows us that nations in this 
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region have the tendency to fall without notice. No clearer example exists than Iran 
itself. Another example of the risk of future instability is Pakistan, which appeared 
to be a responsible and stable regime in the 1980s, when it acquired nuclear 
weapons, but not teeters on the brink of collapse and entertains relations with 
terrorist organizations65. While nuclear weapons were deemed safe in Pakistan in 
the 1980s, today they are considered a high risk. The same could be true for Iran. 
Today it seems stable, but this is no guarantee for the future. The only safe route is 
to ensure that Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons. 
Whatever the reality of Iran’s intentions towards Israel, the Israelis see Iran 
as the greatest threat to their continued existence. Military leaders among the 
Israelis have made it clear that they will do anything in their power to prevent Iran 
from attaining nuclear weapons, including a pre-emptive strike66.  
 It is also important to examine the perceived threat that currently exists in 
Israel. Even if the situation is not as serious as believed, if the situation is deemed to 
be dire by Israeli military officials, then the response to apparent developments in 
Iran’s nuclear weapons program will be one which takes the threat of an Iranian 
attack seriously. Currently, Israel views a nuclear-armed Iran as an existential 
threat. Israeli officials have also said on multiple occasions that a military attack, 
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along with all other options are on the table for Israeli decision makers in 
confronting the possible threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon67. 
Regardless of the threat to the US and Israel, there is also the necessary 
concern of the region being further destabilized due to Iran’s nuclear program. One 
of the biggest threats to stability, apart from the obvious possibility of armed 
conflict, is that a nuclear arms race will be started in the region. The political 
landscape of the Gulf States is dominated by the tension between Iran and the Arab 
Gulf States68. Saudi Arabia, the leading power in the region, has already condemned 
Iran’s nuclear program, and is currently developing its own civilian nuclear 
program69. Much like the Iranians, the Saudis are interested in creating alternatives 
to oil for domestic power generation, with 16 nuclear reactors being slated for 
constructed over the next 20 years. Currently, the Saudi program is strictly focused 
on energy. If Iran, Saudi Arabia’s biggest enemy in the region, develops nuclear 
weapons, the Saudi monarchy will feel the need to match capabilities, and yet 
another nuclear weapon armed country will be created. Furthermore, and Iranian 
bomb would set off a race in the region towards parity, and in some cases would 
encourage other nations to pursue nuclear weapons. A nuclear chain reaction would 
not be surprising to see work its way across the Middle East. Egypt would be one 
country that would gain immensely from pursuing nuclear weapons in Iran joined 
                                                        
67 Bahgat, Gawdat. “Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East: Iran and Israel.” 2005, 
Contemporary Security Policy, 26:1, 25-43, DOI: 10.1080/13523260500116067. At 38. 
68 Cordesman, Anthony H. Center for Strategic Studies. July 15th, 2015.“Joint and 
Asymmetric Warfare, Missiles and Missile Defense, Civil War and Non-State Actors, and 
Outside Powers” Web. At 11. 
69Mehrish, B N. "Iran’s Nuclearization and Its Implications for Global and Regional 
Security." IUP Journal of International Relations 6.2 (2012): 67-79. Ebsco Host. Web. 30 
Nov. 2015. At 75. 
 34 
the nuclear club. Without an alliance with the US or other major power, Egypt would 
be particularly at risk against a nuclear-armed Iran. In this situation, it is likely that 
Egypt would pursue a nuclear weapon, likely followed by its rival Algeria, who 
would be unlikely to allow Egypt to be the only Arab nuclear power in the region70. 
The threat to regional stability from Iran would be nearly limitless. A nuclear-armed 
Iran could act with impunity in the region in pursuing its policy goals, and 
considering its often-public support for terrorist organizations, these policy goals 
would in all likelihood further destabilize the region71. The Middle East has been 
fraught with conflict, adding a nuclear component to the mix would be flirting with 
disaster. If Iran were allowed to develop nuclear weapons, deploy them and theorize 
the conditions for their use, other countries in the region would be forced to do the 
same in order to keep parity with Iran72. 
One serious concern when approaching the issue of a preemptive attack is 
the legality of such a strike. While both the US and Israel would probably move 
ahead with an attack regardless, it is important to understand the context of 
international law in order to later understand how Iran will retaliate in the event of 
an attack. 
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Nations are internationally recognized to have a right to self-defense73. 
However, this right can be difficult to apply in situations where a clear threat is 
present, but no aggression has of yet occurred. This is the difficult case of 
international law that faces Israel and the US. Do they have a legitimate claim of self-
defense in attacking Iran’s nuclear program? 
 The difficulty of this question is that the answer is based on a determination 
that Iran is in fact pursuing nuclear weapons. Ascertaining this fact can be difficult, 
both in lead-up to, and in the aftermath of a preemptive strike. Additionally, the 
international law is unclear on what conditions allow a nation to engage in 
preemptory self-defense. Agreed upon standards do not exist that help to define in 
what situations a nation may take action against other nations in anticipatory self-
defense74 
 Regardless, any action by Israel against Iran runs a high risk of angering the 
international community against Israel based on the idea that Israel is aggressively 
overstepping the limitations of self-defense75. Looking historically, one instance that 
gives some guidance as to how the international legal community may respond to an 
attack by Israel is to examine the response to a previous attack on the part of Israel 
against another Middle Easter nation pursuing nuclear weapons. Israel’s attack on 
Iraq’s Osirak reactor, while being condemned internationally, prevented Iraq from 
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acquiring nuclear weapons, and didn’t result in any major retaliation against 
Israel76. In examining this attack, and understanding of the goals and consequences 
shows that despite the international condemnation, the attack served its purpose 
without incurring unbearable costs. Israel’s goal was to prevent Saddam Hussein 
from acquiring nuclear weapons, which was successfully accomplished, and the only 
real costs incurred was that the international community condemned the attack. 
 Again in 2007, Israel was a participant in a preemptive strike against a 
nuclear related target, this time in Syria. However, unlike in the example of the 
attack on Osirak, the response from the international community was measured. In 
fact, the only foreign country to speak out against the attack was North Korea77. In 
this instance a secret nuclear power plant that was under construction with the help 
of North Korea was destroyed by Israeli air forces. In both of the previous instances 
of Israeli preemptive action against a nuclear force of another nation, a key interest 
for the Israeli government was the purpose of the nuclear program in question. 
 Historically speaking, the standard that the international community has 
followed indicates that a preemptive strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities may fall 
outside the purview of international law. However, the response from the 
international community to those who violate this principle have been limited to 
outcry and condemnation, both results that the US and Israel would be willing to 
undergo in order to prevent Iran from building a nuclear weapon. 
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Politics will also play a key role in determining if an attack will go forward. 
While any pre-emptory strike will be met with a large backlash, there remains 
significant support at home in Israel for a military strike78. Much of the public 
opinion response to an attack would depend on the results of a strike. With a large 
portion of Israel’s air power being devoted to an attack, even the slightest mistake 
would be fatal to the success of the mission, and by extension, the perception of an 
attack back home. 
 Given the past 20 years of American foreign policy, any operation in the 
Middle East brings with it the risk of giving the impression that America is again 
playing the role of international police man, or worse, an imperialistic power 
seeking oil. This was one of the major problems that existed during the Iraq war. 
Rather than seeing America as a liberating country, much of the Middle East saw the 
Iraq war as an attempt on the part of America to steal Iraq’s oil79.  
Serious contemplation of an intervention from the US or Israel in Iran’s 
nuclear program must be tempered at the very outset by the prospect of success of 
any military action. Because of this, much of the remainder of this work will be 
devoted to determining the likelihood of the success of any intervention. 
The first step in analyzing the advisability of military intervention is to define 
success. In order to weigh the wisdom of intervention rests heavily on what can be 
accomplished. A strike that results in an additional three months added to Iran’s 
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breakout time has a significantly different value calculus that a strike that would 
prevent development of a bomb for two or three years. Of course, the easiest strike 
to justify would be a strike that would permanently stop Iran from pursuing nuclear 
weapons. Thus, the definition of success is crucial to contemplating the issue at 
hand. 
Assuming that Iran decides to create a nuclear weapon, an attack would need 
to be successful enough to outweigh serious accompanying repercussions of action. 
Not only would an attacking country both have to deal with political retaliation back 
home, international condemnation abroad, but would also have to live with a world 
where Iran’s current terrorist sponsorship would be significantly expanded to 
unprecedented levels. These concerns have been well documented elsewhere, both 
within this work and in other published material. 
So what can be accomplished? Given the level of advancement that has been 
achieved by the Iranians, the most that can be expected by an Israeli strike is 
probably an additional delay of a year or two80. A US strike could delay the nuclear 
program of Iran by as many as 5 to 10 years. These numbers seem to be highly 
variable, with a lot of room for change. Part of the uncertainty is caused by the 
unknown variable of how Iran will respond. We do not know if a strike will cause 
Iran to give up their weapons program, or if it will cause them to enhance their 
attempts or if it will cause unrest in Tehran leading to a more peaceful government. 
It is also difficult to determine how much of a delay a particular attack will cause. 
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Partially because of the secrecy of Iran’s program but also due in part to the lack of 
ability to predict how quickly Iran would be able to rebuild key facilities, an exact 
estimate is difficult. Chokepoint facilities, those that are key to the development of a 
bomb, would be the target of a preemptive strike. These facilities are well known, 
but the unknown of what type of resources will be necessary for Iran to rebuild 
these facilities and how quickly it will be able to do so81. 
Regime change has become a dirty phrase among policy circles due to several 
failures throughout the world, but it is the most realistic result of a strike that would 
stop Iran’s nuclear program. While the scope of this work doesn’t include the 
possibility of a ground campaign in Iran, this type of military action, followed by a 
change of leadership in Iran could for the foreseeable future end the weapons 
program in Iran, reducing the nuclear program to a state similar to Japan, in which 
the technology exists for a nuclear weapon to be created, but the reality has no 
probability of happening. While regime change would be the “best” option for 
ending the nuclear threat, it is also the least likely result of limited air strikes on the 
nuclear program of Iran. There is a possibility that Iran’s leadership will completely 
give up the prospect of acquiring nuclear weapons and giving up the ability to 
quickly acquire a nuclear weapon, but considering the positions of key Iranian 
leadership members on the subject of nuclear weapons, this should be considered as 
only slightly likely. 
                                                        
81 Kreps, Sarah E. & Fuhrmann, Matthew “Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing Nuclear 
Facilities Affect Proliferation?” 2011, Journal of Strategic Studies, 34:2, 161-187, DOI: 
10.1080/01402390.2011.559021. At 165. 
 40 
A more realistic result of a military strike would be to delay the acquisition of 
a nuclear weapon by 5-10 years82. While the Iranian nuclear program has taken 
more than 35 years to develop to this point, they now have the knowledge and 
technology to reproduce what can be destroyed by air strikes. The variability in the 
time range represents significant unknowns in both Iranian domestic decision-
making, and international responses to a strike. If the international community sees 
the strikes as being necessary given Iran’s actions, they will not support the 
recreation of a nuclear program. Without international support, recreating a nuclear 
program will be difficult due to lack of expertise and materials. However, if the 
international community sees the preemptive attack as being unjustified, then it is 
likely that many countries will compete to help Iran rebuild the destroyed 
infrastructure. 
What if, rather than completely ending the weapons program, or setting it 
back by 5 to 10 years83, the program is only delayed by another 6 to 12 months? 
This scenario is most likely with an Israeli strike because of the lack of long-range, 
heavy bombers and the proper ordnance to carry out an attack on some of Iran’s 
hardened targets.  In this scenario, the decision is more difficult to make because the 
same decision will have to be made again in less than a year. For Israel in particular, 
this would cause great difficulty because of the strain that an operation of this size 
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would have on the Israeli air force. An attack could still be worth it if this initial 
strike could convince other powers to ensure that Iran did not continue its pursuit 
of a nuclear weapon. 
While any intervention intended to stop the immediate construction of a 
nuclear bomb would be difficult, the technological capabilities available today make 
these difficult missions possible. Both the American and Israeli militaries have an 
unprecedented ability to deliver devastating firepower with incredible precision. 
While the attack on Osirak was successfully completed with dumb bombs, which 
were guided simply by momentum and gravity, todays munitions rely on GPS 
guidance to deliver explosives to precise targets. For comparison, the unguided 
bombs previously used were fairly accurate; bombs dropped from an F-16 for 
example, could be predicted to within a circular error probability (CEP) of 8 to 12 
meters. This compared to Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) guided weapons, 
which have a CEP of only 3 meters.84 Additionally, these new GPS guided munitions 
can be dropped from a high altitude, from as far as 15 kilometers away, rather than 
nearly directly above the target85. 
Another factor that will impact both the successfulness and the justifiability 
of an attack is what sites should be included in the target list. While some targets are 
relatively “soft”, meaning that they can easily be neutralized, others would be 
incredibly difficult for any military, even the United States to successfully destroy. 
While thousands of important military targets, and even perhaps hundreds of 
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nuclear related targets can be identified in Iran, the Iranian ability to create material 
for nuclear weapons is limited to just a few targets. 
First, the enrichment facility at Fordow. It is the most difficult target to 
attack, and the one on which much hinges, is the enrichment facility at Fordow. This 
facility, built into the side of a mountain and buried 250 feet underground, would be 
a difficult task for the US to destroy, and a potentially impossible target for Israel to 
destroy. Under the JCPOA, no enrichment is allowed to happen at Fordow for the 
next 15 years86. Israel has no realistic options to destroy this location, though some 
have suggested the use of nuclear weapons on the site. The use of nuclear weapons 
is incredibly unrealistic in this context. The use of a nuclear weapon by one state in 
order to prevent the acquisition of a nuclear weapon by another state would bring 
universal condemnation from the international community. While this 
condemnation would make diplomatic efforts difficult, it isn’t likely that the 
response to will carry anything more serious than condemnation. If Israel were to 
carry out an attack, they would be forced to try to incapacitate the facility by 
attacking the entryways to the facility, requiring that Iran reopen these before it 
could continue enrichment. The US does have some conventional weapons that have 
a legitimate likelihood of damaging or destroying the facility. The Massive Ordnance 
Penetrator or “MOP” as it is commonly known is a conventional bunker-busting 
bomb, which was designed to destroy targets like the Fordow facility. The GBU-57 
A/B – the official nomenclature for the MOP - is capable of burrowing 200 feet into 
                                                        
86 Hussain, Nazir and Abdullah Sannia. “Iran Nuclear Deal: Implications for Regional 
Security” Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 22, Issue - 2, 2015, 475:493. At 481. 
 43 
the ground and through 60 feet of concrete before exploding87. The The MOP gives 
the US a credible option to destroy the Fordow facility. Basic math tells us that two 
MOPs would need to be deployed in order to penetrate the Fordow facility. This 
doesn’t pose a problem because MOPs are meant to be used in pairs: the first to 
digging a path for the second to follow and subsequently destroy the target. This 
strategy of attacking the exact same point multiple times with an armament is 
known as “burrowing” and was originally conceptualized prior to the 1991 Gulf 
War88. An additional strategy in a truly desperate situation would be to destroy the 
entrances to the facility. This would be a temporary measure that would only push 
the issue further down the road, but could function as a stopgap measure if Israel or 
the US decides to attack the facility without the use of the MOP. The Fordow facility 
does pose the greatest problem for intervention, but several options remain for a 
strike. The Fordow facility is a key link in Iran’s nuclear chain because of its 
enrichment capabilities. In order to create weapon, Iran must produce a 
considerable amount of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and Fordow is the best 
option that Iran has for doing so, largely because of the security of the mountainous 
site. 
Second, the uranium conversion facility at Isfahan. Uranium Hexaflouride 
(UH6) is the fuel for uranium centrifuges. While the recent nuclear deal focused 
extensively on centrifuges, specifically how many Iran may produce and operate, 
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this becomes irrelevant without fuel to feed the centrifuges. Isfahan is the only 
domestic site that has the capability to produce UH6 for the Iranians89. Without the 
ability to fuel its centrifuges, Iran has little ability to enrich uranium, which is the 
key to producing a nuclear weapon. The facility at Isfahan does not appear to be 
hardened, and is located above ground90 and is therefore not considered a very 
difficult target. 2,000 lb. BLU 109 bombs could be used to destroy this facility, with 
approximately 12 being necessary to guarantee destruction of all critical equipment 
at the facility91. 
Third, the Natanz uranium enrichment facility. The enrichment facility at 
Natanz is essentially a large warehouse for centrifuges. The benefit of attacking this 
facility is that Iran would lose the immense capital investment that it has placed in 
these centrifuges92. This facility would be a difficult target to destroy, but would not 
pose such a risk of failure as to preclude an attack. The enrichment facility is an 
underground target with between 8 and 23 meters of earth and concrete covering 
the target. Again using the MOP, the US could penetrate this facility even without 
burrowing. The Israelis would also have the ability to destroy this facility with the 
5,000 lb BLU-115 warhead. The use of three of these BLU-115s would be more than 
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sufficient to penetrate and destroy each of the two major underground facilities at 
Natanz93. 
Fourth, the Arak heavy water reactor. Heavy water reactors pose a significant 
risk because they produce as a byproduct plutonium, which can be used to make a 
bomb. While there are some civilian application for the byproducts of heavy water 
reactors, the facility at Arak would create much more than could be used in Iran. 
This leads experts to view Arak as a significant proliferation risk in that it provides 
Iran with a direct path to a bomb94. Luckily, the Arack facility is only in the earliest 
stages of construction and doesn’t pose an immediate threat. It would most likely be 
a target if a strike were ordered though, and would only necessitate additional non-
penetrating, smaller warheads95. 
Other targets exist, such as the Russian built reactor at Bushehr, which is the 
most well known nuclear site in Iran, these other targets are not essential to the 
production of a bomb. Specifically, the Bushehr site is not of great interest to us for 
several reasons. First, the technology for a light-water reactor like the one at 
Bushehr is readily available and relatively easily replaced. Second, the light-water 
reactor creates neither highly enriched uranium nor plutonium – both essential to 
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the creation of a functioning nuclear weapon. Lastly, sites like Bushehr are soft 
targets, easily destroyed with sea-based cruise missiles96. 
Other sites would be attacked in the process of destroying the Iranian 
nuclear sites. Air defense and early warning installations would be some of the first 
sites targeted. This would be accomplished by strike aircraft similar to those used in 
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses in the recent Iraq war: F-15 Strike Eagles and F-
18 Super Hornets delivering missiles that target the radars used by the air defense 
systems, and EA-18G Growlers which would be used to jam enemy missiles 
attempting to target US aircraft. 
 While the US has been involved in several conflicts that required it to attack 
various air defense systems, the Iranian air defense have not been tested since the 
Iran-Iraq war. Because of sanctions, Iran is working to create its own domestic 
military industry. Of particular interest to the Iranians is the development of missile 
capabilities; in particular, long-range precision guided rockets and missiles97. 
Because of the loss of American supply following the Iranian Revolution, Iran’s 
current air defense system is a patchwork of dilapidated US technology manned by 
inexperienced and untrained crews and newer technology from Russia and China98. 
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 The problem of Iran’s military is particularly time sensitive. While the 
sanctions regime drained Iran’s economy, and by extension, government coffers, the 
implementation of the JCPOA is likely to result in substantial growth for the Iranian 
economy99. The economic boost that the JCPOA will give to the Iranian economy is 
likely to come both from foreign trade and to increased investment within the 
country. This is interesting to us because a burgeoning Iranian economy is also 
likely to improve the quality of the technology operated by the Iranian military. This 
improved technology could range from vastly improved air defense systems from 
Russia to stealth fighters from China. These contracts have not yet materialized, but 
would change the equation significantly. While US forces could still operate in an 
environment saturated with new technology, it would greatly increase the number 
of aircraft needed, and would likely also increase the number of aircraft lost. 
 A further complicating factor in attacking Iran’s nuclear program is that it 
has been designed with a hostile international community in mind. Iran never 
viewed its nuclear program as being one that would enjoy support, and even 
planned that it would meet resistance from several sources. Besides simply keeping 
its nuclear program a secret, Iran has also learned important lessons from history, 
in particular Iraq’s experience with attempting to create a nuclear program and has 
specifically avoided pitfalls that would allow for a single attack or set back to 
substantially damage the overall program’s success, for example, creating facilities 
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buried deep within mountains, spread throughout the country or even within urban 
population centers100. 
 However, in the near term, the challenges addressed earlier in this work will 
still have a controlling impact on Iran’s attempt to shoot down American or Israeli 
aircraft. Lack of modern technology, and proper maintenance and training indicate 
that even Iran’s best attempts to intercept American aircraft will be unsuccessful. If 
the attacking aircraft have even basic fighter sweeps ahead of the strike aircraft, the 
Iranian fighters will have little impact on the attacking force101. If history is any 
indicator, the power of American air forces will quickly overwhelm any Iranian air 
force attempt to deter attackers. For example, in 1991, with a better air force, the 
Iraqis decided to simply stop sending aircraft to attack American strike aircraft due 
to heavy losses102. 
 A US attack on Iranian nuclear infrastructure would be a fairly simply 
operation logistically, at least compared to other operations. To attack the listed 
four facilities, 8 B-2 bombers would need to be rebased to the air base at Diego 
Garcia103. These long-range bombers would be armed with the MOP described 
previously. Each B-2 has the capability to carry two MOPs, giving each key site four 
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MOPs on target. These B-2s would be escorted by either F-18s from the 5th fleet, or 
F-15E’s from bases in the region. These F-18s and F-15s could also be tasked with 
attacking other targets, Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) and interdiction 
of whatever aircraft Iran manages to attempt to intercept strike aircraft with104. 
These aircraft could also be supplemented with EA-18 Growlers from the 5th fleet, to 
assist with SEAD. Depending on the target list, Tomahawk cruise missiles could also 
be launched from the 5th fleet to neutralize non-nuclear target sites throughout Iran. 
 A list of targets for the US to attack would depend a lot on the decisions of 
American military commanders. I only go into detail on the key parts of the nuclear 
infrastructure that would need to be destroyed. However, these are also the most 
highly protected and hardened sites in Iran. Other targets would be destroyed with 
relative ease compared to these deeply buried and hardened sites. 
 While any Israeli strike will be a difficult undertaking, there are several 
options that Israeli military commanders will have to choose between. The primary 
question that will have to be resolved will be the route taken in order to make a 
strike on Iran. 
The first option would be for Israeli jets to fly north, refuel over the 
Mediterranean and then fly through Turkey to Iran. This route would offer the 
easiest refueling, without any threats, over international waters. This route would 
take Israeli jets through Turkish airspace and near several of Turkey’s largest 
airbases. It is unknown how Turkey would respond to this because there haven’t 
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been any publicly available comments on the topic, though Turkey and Israel have 
historically remained peaceful despite sharing harsh words in public. This route 
would give Israeli aircraft some leeway in maneuvering against Iranian air defense 
because of the possibility to refuel on the return leg of the flight, again over the 
Mediterranean105.  
The Middle route involves Israeli aircraft flying essentially directly across 
Jordan and possibly Saudi Arabia into Iraq. This route would be 1,750 km, just above 
the 1,700 km max range of Israel’s aircraft, so refueling would also be required on 
this route. In this scenario, the refueling would have to happen over Iraq, which 
would be politically difficult. Iraq has been cultivating closer relations with Iran 
since American troops left the country, so it is unknown what actions Iraq would 
take against Israeli jets crossing its airspace to attack Iran. This route would allow 
the Israeli air force to fly over the least amount of Iranian air space to reach the 
targets, however, given the proximity to the Iraqi border, air defense in the area 
might be more ready than on the Turkish border106. 
 The final option for an Israeli air attack would be a southern route 
along the border of Saudi Arabian-Iraqi border, over the Persian Gulf and then into 
Iran. This route would be the longest at 2,410 km, again requiring refueling. 
Diplomatically speaking, this route would be difficult to facilitate, though the Saudis 
would probably be the most willing to allow the Israeli’s to fly through their 
airspace towards Iran. This would also be the least well-defended route of the three 
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on the part of the Iranians, though refueling would be the most difficult of the three 
routes107. 
Each of these routes is problematic because each requires Israeli aircraft to 
fly through Arab airspace. While absent a threat of a nuclearized Iran, this action 
would be pretext for war, the Arab world fears a nuclear Iran as much as Israel or 
the US, and would in all likelihood do nothing to stop Israel from passing through 
their airspace on the way to attack Iran108. The power politics in the region would in 
this instance allow a normally unimaginable option to be realistic. 
An operation by either the US or Israel would be subject to the normal 
problems that arise in the midst of a military operation. Issues such as mechanical 
difficulties with aircraft would have a potentially devastating impact on an Israeli 
strike; they would be less impactful on an American operation. This is due to both 
the distance that Israeli aircraft have to fly to reach targets in Iran and the total 
number of aircraft available.  
Conclusions: 
The analysis above shows that both the US and Israel have the ability to delay 
Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon on a temporary basis. Both nations have the 
technological capabilities to seriously damage key parts of Iran’s nuclear 
infrastructure while maintaining sufficient resources in the area to counter any 
retaliation from the Iranians. 
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How Iran will react to an attack on its nuclear facilities is a topic of 
considerable debate. The Iranians have access to considerable conventional as well 
as chemical weapons, in addition to having extensive control over a wide array of 
groups throughout the region that could be activated against either the US or Israel. 
One framework to approach this question from suggests that Iran will do whatever 
it can to weaken US influence in the region, but not push so far as to invite further 
condemnation from the world, or worse, further strikes from the United States. 
While a strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure would be embarrassing, and would 
force Iran to retrace its steps on its approach to a weapon, it would not be 
particularly damaging to Iran’s economy, or military assets, or its ability to project 
power throughout the region. If the option of acquiring nuclear weapons is 
temporarily removed from the table by a preemptive strike, Iran will then do what it 
can to control the damage, all the while keeping with its overall strategy of 
attempting to become the regional superpower. 
The most likely retaliation that Iran would consider would be the activation 
of its various terrorist networks. This would allow Iran to take vengeance for the 
attacks without necessarily putting itself at risk of further attack. Hezbollah and 
Hamas both would be tasked with attacks on Israel. However, the impact of these 
attacks is uncertain. Israeli technology has improved dramatically at countering the 
threats of these terrorist groups. In a worst-case scenario, Israel could quickly take 
control of the territory from which these attacks were being launched until the 
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threat passed109. While this would be far from an ideal reality, the necessity of 
preventing Iran from possessing a nuclear weapon could press Israel to accept the 
possibility of this retaliation. 
The most serious concern in attacking Iran’s nuclear infrastructure would be 
that Iran would retaliate with chemical weapons against Israel, US bases or other 
nations in the Middle East. Iran has in all likelihood developed the ability to mount 
chemical warheads onto Shahab-3 missiles110. The only scenario where this 
outcome would be even remotely likely would be if a hardliner regime takes over in 
Tehran. A chemical attack would so alienate Iran’s tentative allies that the regime 
would risk losing any remaining legitimacy in the region. Additionally, this action 
would most likely invite additional American strikes, and would most definitely 
cause the Israelis to attack Iran. While an attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure 
would be tailored to only impact the narrowly defined nuclear assets necessary to 
prevent the acquisition of a nuclear weapon, a second strike would be much less 
restricted. A follow-on attack in response to the use of chemical weapons would be 
devastating to Iran’s military and economy, and could even threaten the stability of 
the regime itself. 
Closing the straits of Hormuz would be one way that many analysts believe 
that Iran could retaliate. Because Iran has been unable to compete with the US for 
technological supremacy in the region, it has instead resorted to building up its 
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ability to challenge the United States and her allies asymmetrically, that is, rather 
than fight against a vastly superior foe, focus on battles that can be won. One of the 
ways that Iran has worked to build up this ability is in its anti-ship capability111. 
Blockading the straits of Hormuz would limit some of the 17 million barrels of per 
day that travel through the straits112 from reaching markets, causing a spike in 
worldwide oil prices. Iran doesn’t have to actually block the straits with its ships, or 
deny passage with missile forces, it could simply mine the straits, which would 
prevent ships from passing through the straits until extensive mine clearing once 
again makes the straits clear again113. Iran would need to lay about 700 mines in 
order to make passing through the straits too dangerous for commercial traffic and 
could accomplish this level of mine-laying with its current fleet of both surface and 
submarine assets114. Based on historic rates of clearing mines, the US could clear a 
route through the straits to allow essential traffic within 4 days, and have all mines 
cleared within 36 days115. The ability of Iran to lay these mines would be the key 
issue. While they are technically capable of completing the mission, assuming an air 
strike has already occurred, US forces in the area would be on high alert to counter 
any attempts to mine the strait before the minefield was set, rather than trying to 
clear it after the fact. The major downside for Iran in mining the straits of Hormuz 
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would be that they would suffer from a lack of oil exports. If Iran is acting in a way 
that works to preserve their national interests, which they have done so far, they 
would avoid mining the straits because of the impact to their economy and the 
likelihood to increase further American intervention into Iran116. 
Iran could also harass shipping in the Persian Gulf with small boats and 
cruise missiles. While US military warships have extensive training against small 
boat attacks, commercial shipping would certainly be at risk if Iran were to start 
attacking oil shipping in the Persian Gulf. With existing US capabilities in the region, 
anti-ship missiles would pose only a limited threat. These missiles are launched 
form mobile launchers, which rather than stationary sites present the difficulty of 
first finding the location of the launcher. The higher the rate of missiles launched 
from sites in Iran, the less time that it will take US forces to identify, target and 
destroy these mobile sites. Because of this reason, the anti-ship missiles that Iran 
has stockpiled constitute only a limited threat to shipping in the straits of Hormuz 
and rather than being used as a tool to sink ships, would rather be used to inspire 
fear117. This outcome can be reasonably expected in the immediate aftermath of an 
attack, though it would be only a temporary threat to shipping in the straits. 
Another factor that cannot be overstated is how the lack of command and 
control will keep Tehran from mounting a successful defense of its nuclear sites. 
Even in situations where the technology exists, well-trained crews, and well-
maintained equipment exist; Iran lacks the critical assets necessary to coordinate 
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attacks on aircraft penetrating Iranian airspace. There is little to no advanced 
warning capability, or working high-tech radar118. Iran lacks the command 
infrastructure to identify threats, positively identify enemies, and then task assets 
on the destruction of these enemy targets. What could be a marginally effective air 
defense system is crippled by a lack of a central authority to coordinate an intricate 
response to threats119. 
Iran could also attack Israel with its Shahab-3 SSMs. Even if a preemptive 
attack comes from the US, Israel is likely to be targeted for retaliation. While the 
Shahab-3 missile has the range to reach Israel, and is a new design, Israel is well 
equipped to handle this threat. While any long-range SSM missile with multiple 
warheads poses a serious threat to a nations air defenses, the work that Israel has 
done to ensure its safety is extensive. These efforts go back to the 1980s, when 
Israel joined the US in research efforts towards a new missile defense system. The 
Arrow defense system is the culmination of these research efforts. Unlike the United 
States, Israel currently has a working missile defense shield. The Arrow has the 
ability to track and engage multiple warheads, discern between real targets and 
decoys, and has independent analysis of the system has suggested that the Arrow 
system would defeat 95% of the missiles that it engages120. Given the lack of 
likelihood of a successful missile strike, and the certain devastating retaliation form 
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both the US and Israel, this option would be considered unwise for Iran in all but the 
most unlikely scenarios. 
 How the international community is likely to respond to an attack also plays 
a key role in any analysis of the advisability of an attack. While the US is likely to 
support to Israel in an attack, the reaction of the rest of the world, and particularly 
of Arab countries is less clear. 
 Arab countries in general, with a few notable exceptions, have a tenuous 
relationship with Iran. Iran and Saudi Arabia currently are competing for regional 
hegemony, so it is likely that other Arab countries will largely mirror the reaction of 
Saudi Arabia. While many Arab countries are concerned by developments to Iran’s 
nuclear program, that concern is unlikely to translate to broad, popular support for 
either an Israeli or American attack on Iran, despite the relief of considerable 
tension in the Middle East without the specter of a nuclear-armed Iran121. 
 The context of an attack is also incredibly important. While an attack today 
would be inadvisable and unnecessary, and roundly condemned by the international 
community, there are scenarios where the international community would not 
respond negatively to a strike122. Given the JCPOA, action is not currently necessary, 
however, if Iran were to violate the JCPOA to the extent that the United States or 
Israel felt that it was necessary to attack Iran, it seems likely that the rest of the 
world would at least tolerate this action.  
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 Even if the international community publicly condemns the attacks as a 
violation of sovereignty, the likelihood of further action is slim. While criticizing 
either the US or Israel would be a politically safe response, most nations both in the 
region and throughout the world would ultimately be in a more secure position 
following a strike, and thus would be unwilling to retaliate in a meaningful way123. 
 The recent agreement to the JCPOA between Iran and the P5+1 countries was 
heralded as a turning point in the relationship between Iran and the rest of the 
world. So far, the implementation of the JCPOA has proceeded according to plan, 
with the Iranians acquiescing the expectations of the IAEA and the international 
community. All the while, the rhetoric of Iranian government officials has continued 
to be openly hostile towards the US and Israel. Additionally, Iran has been found 
supporting rebels in Yemen since the signing of the JCPOA124. While some recent 
actions have indicated that Iran has decided to participate in the international 
community in the capacity of a legitimate state, other events have shown that there 
is still a strong hardliner presence in the decision making process of Iranian political 
action. 
 While the West should stand strongly behind the JCPOA, and work to ensure 
that it is followed by Iran, there should also continue to be a high level of alertness 
when considering the Iranian nuclear program. What we have seen here is that 
military force can be an effective tool in enforcing the nuclear regime. Iran has, of its 
own free will, agreed to a specific set of rules regarding its nuclear program. The 
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international community should work to make sure that these rules are now 
followed with the hope that Iran will be integrated into the international community 
as a legitimate state actor. However, the option of military force should remain on 
the table as a tool to ensure that Iran does not test the resolve of the international 
nuclear regime on the JCPOA. This analysis shows that both the US or Israel could 
effectively prevent, at least temporarily, the Iranian nuclear program from 
developing a nuclear weapon. The isolation of the Iranian program to a few key 
facilities allows a narrow, targeted strike to efficiently cripple the Iranian program.  
The prospect of war with Iran should be considered as a last resort. A strike 
against the nuclear facilities would be devastating to Iran, both economically and 
politically, but would also be damaging to US interests in the region. This would be 
due to both the to the international backlash that would likely accompany an attack, 
as well as the repercussions to American allies in the region. This being said, it is 
important to maintain the ability to control the situation in Iran. While great 
progress appears to have been made in Iran, as evidenced through the JCPOA, there 
remain within the mainstream of Iranian politics forces who are diametrically 
opposed to peace with the US or Israel, these forces must be taken seriously. While a 
strike seems unnecessary at this point, close monitoring of the status of Iran’s 
nuclear program is necessary and is happening under the JCPOA. Another necessity 
is that the US remain ready to intervene should the situation deteriorate. Keeping a 
military presence in the region helps, but there is also a necessity to continue 
considering how intervention will happen. This work ultimately helps to accomplish 
this goal by examining what challenges exist for the US in maintaining a status quo 
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where an Iranian bomb can be denied. Further analysis is necessary on the ability of 
the US to slow or even stop the Iranian pursuit of a bomb, should it become 
necessary. Some analysts would say that the time for military intervention has 
passed, that there is no longer a necessity for war. At this time, that argument would 
appear to be true. However, politics in Middle Eastern countries have a tendency to 
change abruptly without notice. If this were to happen, if the progress that has been 
made diplomatically were to be undone, we must keep the ability to protect the 
world from a nuclear-armed Iran. While we may believe that military analysis is 
unnecessary, and hope that this is true, it remains a necessity for US policy makers, 
even as Iran appears to be making progress towards rejoining the international 
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